From Voice-Centric to Data-Driven Critical Communications

Back in 2024, I came across an excellent GSMA APAC webinar looking at the evolution of critical communications from predominantly voice-centric systems towards broadband, data-driven solutions. I had intended to write about it at the time but, as often happens, it remained on my ever-growing list of potential blog posts.

Watching it again in 2026, what struck me was not how much of it had become dated, but how relevant its central message remains.

The transition is not a simple replacement of TETRA, P25 and other narrowband systems with 4G and 5G. For many public safety and critical industry users, the more realistic path is a long period of coexistence, convergence and interworking.

Traditional narrowband critical communication systems were built around some very demanding requirements. Coverage and availability must be there 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Different agencies need to communicate during major incidents. Group communications are fundamental. Security, reliability and resilience are essential. Devices must also be fit for purpose, whether they are being used by police officers, firefighters, ambulance crews or workers in other critical industries.

Broadband does not remove any of those requirements. Instead, it adds another layer of expectations.

Public safety and critical industry users increasingly need access to high-resolution video, mapping, live location, sensor information, databases, drones, body-worn cameras and other sources of real-time information. Voice remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own.

This is why 3GPP Mission Critical Services, generally referred to collectively as MCX, are so important. Mission Critical Push-to-Talk, Mission Critical Video and Mission Critical Data provide a standards-based framework for extending critical communications beyond traditional voice services.

The Critical Communications Association, TCCA, highlighted an important reality during the webinar. Narrowband and broadband systems will coexist for many years. Some organisations are augmenting existing systems with commercial mobile networks, others are deploying dedicated broadband networks, and many are adopting hybrid approaches combining dedicated, shared and commercial infrastructure.

There is no single migration model.

One of the most interesting examples came from New Zealand, where the Public Safety Network is being delivered across multiple components rather than as a single replacement network.

The narrowband element uses P25 Phase 2 for mission-critical voice, while the cellular element brings together coverage from the country's major mobile networks. The aim is to allow public safety users to make use of more than one network instead of being limited to the coverage footprint of a single operator.

At the time of the webinar, around 15,000 users were already using the cellular service and more than 430,000 roaming sessions had taken place without major issues. The combined approach was estimated to provide around a 5% improvement in usable coverage.

Interestingly, the improvement was not only in remote rural areas.

Many of the benefits came from small urban coverage gaps where one operator might have poor or no signal because of buildings or local radio conditions, while another operator remained available. For a consumer, this might simply be an inconvenience. For a first responder trying to access operational information during an incident, it can be far more serious.

The webinar gave an example of a firearms incident in a remote area. Only one officer present had migrated to the new public safety SIM, but that user had connectivity from an alternative network and was able to provide access for other personnel. This allowed the team to obtain information about the offender, access intelligence and maintain communications with the command centre.

Another example involved an ambulance crew using improved connectivity to help direct a helicopter to the correct location.

The next step was quality, priority and pre-emption. These capabilities are essential because access to multiple commercial networks is only one part of the problem. During congestion, public safety users need to receive the appropriate treatment ahead of ordinary traffic.

New Zealand was also looking at deployable coverage solutions for situations where cellular coverage does not exist or where infrastructure has been damaged by a natural disaster. Portable systems using satellite backhaul and local cellular coverage can be taken into the field and deployed by first responders without requiring a team of radio engineers.

This is an important part of the changing critical communications architecture.

Coverage is increasingly becoming multi-layered. A user may rely on a terrestrial mobile network under normal conditions, another operator where the primary network is unavailable, a deployable small cell during an emergency, and satellite connectivity when terrestrial infrastructure cannot be reached.

The same principle appeared in a very different example from Australia.

Icon Water provides essential water and wastewater services across the Australian Capital Territory. The organisation had been using an ageing voice-centric narrowband radio system and wanted to move towards broadband critical communications. The challenge was that around 30% of its operational area was not covered by terrestrial mobile networks.

Simply replacing the radio system with an application running over a commercial 4G network would therefore not have been sufficient.

The solution combined a dedicated MCX platform with multiple forms of connectivity. Where terrestrial 4G was available, users could connect through the mobile network. When vehicles moved outside cellular coverage, smart routers could use LEO satellite connectivity as an alternative backhaul path, with Wi-Fi providing local access for users and devices.

This is a good example of why the future of critical communications should not be viewed as a competition between terrestrial mobile and satellite networks. The two can complement one another.

The Icon Water deployment also demonstrated how broadband expands the communications environment beyond push-to-talk voice. The platform could support video, file sharing, emergency alerting, location information, lone-worker protection and integration with external systems such as body-worn cameras, CCTV, drones and IoT sensors.

At some fixed locations, in-building mobile coverage was also poor. Repeaters were used to improve the coverage at surveyed locations from around 12% to approximately 90%.

Again, there was no single technology solving every problem.

The wider webinar also showed how similar changes are taking place across other critical industries. Mining, energy, utilities and ports are increasingly using private 4G and 5G networks for applications ranging from low-data-rate sensors to high-definition video and remote control.

The Port of Port Hedland example included marine sensor connectivity, worker mobility and connectivity for visiting seafarers. The network had to cover operations extending beyond the traditional office or factory environment and out towards maritime areas.

Rail communications are following a similar path. The Future Railway Mobile Communication System, FRMCS, is being developed around 5G and MCX principles, supporting not only critical voice and signalling but also applications such as CCTV, passenger information, staff communications and future automation.

Some of the deployment timelines discussed in the 2024 webinar have naturally moved on since then, but the technical direction remains clear. Critical communications are becoming increasingly software-driven, data-rich and dependent on a combination of communications technologies.

5G-connected UAVs were another example. A presentation from China Mobile International looked at how network-connected drones could support emergency response, policing, firefighting, monitoring and other low-altitude applications. Instead of the drone being simply a remotely controlled flying camera, it becomes part of a wider communications and information system.

This brings us to what I thought was the strongest message from the panel discussion at the end of the webinar.

Dr Jolly Wong, formerly CTO of the Hong Kong Police Force, described the transition using two Cs: convergence and coexistence.

Narrowband critical communication systems remain highly relevant to organisation-centric group communications. They are built around reliable voice, established operational procedures and communication within defined groups.

Broadband, on the other hand, enables more information-centric operations. Users can access video, data, applications, sensors and other sources of information that improve situational awareness and decision-making.

The two approaches have different strengths.

The migration cannot happen overnight, so narrowband and broadband systems need to work together. Interworking between different systems, networks and groups therefore becomes an essential part of the transition.

Dr Wong used the analogy of yin and yang.

On one side are the traditional strengths of mission-critical voice: resilience, security, availability, reliability and consistency.

On the other side are the strengths of broadband and data-driven communications: multimedia, video, applications, IoT, AI, innovation and agility.

The future is not simply one side replacing the other. It is about finding the right balance between them.

This may also explain why the transition to broadband critical communications has taken longer than some originally expected. Replacing a consumer mobile service is relatively easy. Replacing a communications system that people depend on in fires, floods, terrorist incidents, accidents and other emergencies is completely different.

The technology must work, but that is only the start. Coverage, spectrum, security, interoperability, certification, priority, pre-emption, devices, applications, operational processes and user behaviour all have to be considered.

As critical communications become more data-driven, the network itself is also becoming less visible to the user. A first responder should not need to think about whether connectivity is coming from the primary mobile operator, another operator, a private network, a deployable system or a satellite link.

The objective is reliable access to voice, data and applications wherever they are needed.

Nearly two years after the original webinar, the move from voice-centric to data-driven critical communications is still very much a journey rather than a completed transition. Perhaps the most important lesson is that the future will not be defined by one network or one technology.

It will be defined by how well narrowband, broadband, private networks, public mobile networks and satellite connectivity can work together to provide the coverage, resilience and information that critical users need.

The full GSMA APAC webinar is embedded below.

CBRS Comes of Age as a Shared Spectrum Success Story

The Citizens Broadband Radio Service, better known as CBRS, has often been described as an experiment in spectrum sharing. Based on the latest OnGo Alliance webinar on the state of CBRS, that description no longer feels accurate. CBRS is now a sizeable and maturing wireless ecosystem in the United States, supporting mobile operators, cable companies, wireless internet service providers, private network deployments, neutral host systems and a growing range of enterprise use cases.

For those less familiar with CBRS, it operates in the 3.5 GHz band in the United States and uses a shared spectrum framework. Rather than relying only on traditional exclusive licensing or completely unlicensed access, CBRS introduced a three-tier model, coordinated through a Spectrum Access System, or SAS. This software-based coordination layer allows different users to access spectrum while protecting incumbent users, including government and defence systems.

The model has taken more than a decade to develop. The discussion began around 2012, when US policymakers and defence stakeholders started exploring whether mid-band spectrum could be shared more efficiently between government and commercial users. The first FCC rule and order arrived in 2015, followed by the creation of the OnGo Alliance in 2016. The role of the Alliance was to bring together government, industry, technology providers and users to translate the regulatory framework into a workable commercial ecosystem.

A key point from the webinar was that CBRS has not developed as a single-sector technology. It is not just for mobile operators, and it is not just for private wireless. It brings together mobile network operators, cable companies, WISPs, system integrators, RAN vendors, device manufacturers, SAS administrators, enterprises, airports, campuses, healthcare facilities, utilities and many others. This diversity is one of the main reasons CBRS has become interesting from a broader telecoms perspective.

The scale of deployment is now significant. The webinar highlighted more than 437,000 CBRS devices deployed across the United States, more than 1,000 CBRS operators and networks, around 1,100 certified end-user devices supporting Band 48, and more than 1,800 private network deployments. The total ecosystem investment was described as being more than 14 billion US dollars, including spectrum, equipment, standardisation, technology development, SAS infrastructure and sensing networks.

The Priority Access Licence, or PAL, auction also played an important role. Auction 105 raised close to 5 billion US dollars and created around 22,000 PAL licences. Unlike some traditional spectrum auctions, the county-based licence areas allowed smaller and regional players to participate, particularly in rural and suburban markets. This is important because CBRS has become a practical tool not only for national-scale operators but also for smaller service providers addressing local connectivity needs.

One of the most useful ways to understand CBRS is to place it between two familiar models. On one side there is unlicensed spectrum, mainly associated with Wi-Fi, which is easy to access but can suffer from congestion and unpredictability. On the other side there is exclusive licensed spectrum, which provides stronger control but is expensive, complex and usually held by major operators. CBRS sits between these models. General Authorised Access, or GAA, provides licence-by-rule access, while PAL provides a higher-priority licensed layer. The SAS coordinates access and helps manage coexistence.

This software-managed spectrum access model is one of the most important aspects of CBRS. In a traditional licensing model, gaining access to spectrum can be slow and expensive. In CBRS, the SAS can authorise spectrum use in minutes. The network operator interacts with the SAS, while the end user does not need to know that this process is happening. In many deployments, even the radio does not need to communicate directly with the SAS because a domain proxy or network management system can handle that interaction.

The webinar also made clear that CBRS is evolving. CBRS 2.0, introduced in 2024, expanded availability by refining the way incumbent protection is handled. This opened the band to an additional 72 million Americans, mainly through software and regulatory improvements rather than any major change in physical infrastructure. That is a powerful example of how shared spectrum systems can improve over time as data, models and operational experience mature.

Fixed Wireless Access is one of the most visible CBRS use cases. WISPs and FWA providers are using CBRS to serve suburban, rural and ultra-rural communities, often in places where connectivity options are limited. The webinar suggested that CBRS-based WISPs and FWA providers are serving more than 10 million residential customers in the United States, with many of these customers located in areas that have fewer than two viable internet options.

This is a useful reminder that wireless and fibre should not always be seen as competing technologies. In many rural deployments, CBRS is used as part of a hybrid model, with fibre providing backhaul and fixed wireless covering the final stretch. This can be faster and cheaper than extending fibre everywhere, particularly in difficult terrain or sparsely populated areas. It can also be more resilient in emergencies, as wireless networks can often be restored more quickly after fires, floods or other disasters.

The discussion also touched on competition from low Earth orbit satellite systems such as Starlink and future Amazon Kuiper services. The speakers framed satellite and CBRS-based FWA more as complementary technologies than direct competitors. This is a sensible view. Rural broadband is not a single-problem market. Some locations will be better served by terrestrial fixed wireless, some by fibre, some by satellite, and many by a combination of these approaches. The real value comes from having multiple options.

Private networks are another major part of the CBRS story. Enterprises can use CBRS spectrum for their own dedicated cellular networks, with applications tailored to their operational needs. These networks can sit inside the enterprise firewall and support predictable performance, mobility and security. Typical applications include point-of-sale terminals, push-to-talk communications, video surveillance, automated guided vehicles, warehouse systems, robotics, utilities, airports, ports, rail yards and industrial facilities.

The mobility angle is especially important. Wi-Fi is excellent for many indoor and enterprise use cases, but private cellular can provide more predictable mobility, coverage and quality of service in large sites, outdoor environments and industrial locations. As physical AI, robotics and autonomous systems become more widely deployed, reliable wireless connectivity will become more important. CBRS gives enterprises in the United States a practical route to deploy private cellular without needing to own exclusive nationwide spectrum.

Neutral host networks were also highlighted as a major growth area. In this model, an enterprise, venue or building owner deploys CBRS-based infrastructure to improve indoor mobile coverage for users of public mobile networks. This can help solve the common problem of poor indoor mobile signal, dropped calls and dead zones, especially in buildings where a traditional distributed antenna system is too expensive or too difficult to justify.

The safety aspect of neutral host coverage deserves more attention. Buildings often have public safety communications requirements for first responders, but the ability of occupants to call emergency services from inside the building is just as important. A neutral host system integrated with mobile operators can support emergency calling and wireless emergency alerts. This makes indoor cellular coverage not just a convenience issue but a safety and resilience issue.

The webinar suggested that around 80% of buildings in the United States lack adequate mobile coverage. While this figure may vary depending on building type and methodology, the underlying point is easy to recognise. Many offices, schools, hospitals, hotels, warehouses and public buildings still have patchy indoor mobile coverage. CBRS-based neutral host systems could lower the barrier for improving this, especially in mid-sized buildings that would not previously have justified a traditional operator-led solution.

Several verticals were identified as having strong growth potential. Airports are already emerging as a good example, with CBRS supporting operational communications, asset tracking, baggage handling and other behind-the-scenes functions. Ports, shipyards, utilities, factories, schools, campuses, hospitals, tribal communities, hospitality venues, stadiums and public sector facilities were also mentioned as areas where CBRS can support either private networks, neutral host networks or both.

Smart agriculture is another interesting opportunity. Farms often have poor mobile coverage but growing connectivity needs, from precision agriculture and sensors to equipment monitoring and automation. CBRS could provide localised, high-quality coverage where traditional mobile networks are weak or unavailable. Healthcare was also mentioned as a sector with significant potential, particularly as hospitals still rely on a mix of legacy communications tools while demanding more reliable mobile and telemetry connectivity.

One of the more forward-looking points came near the end of the webinar, where CBRS was positioned as a good candidate for AI-enhanced spectrum management. Because CBRS relies heavily on software, propagation models, measurements, databases and SAS-based decision-making, it creates an environment where AI could potentially improve spectrum availability and interference management. This will require careful regulatory support, but the idea is important. Spectrum sharing should not be static. It should improve as better data and better models become available.

The broader lesson from CBRS is that shared spectrum can work when the technical, regulatory and commercial models are aligned. It has created a middle ground between unlicensed and exclusive licensed spectrum. It has enabled smaller operators and enterprises to access mid-band spectrum. It has supported rural broadband, private networks and neutral host systems. It has also shown that incumbent protection and commercial deployment do not have to be mutually exclusive.

There are still challenges. Regulatory uncertainty remains a concern, especially if potential investors or deployers worry that the rules could change. Further refinements will be needed around incumbent protection, antenna heights, fixed satellite protection, indoor systems, distributed antenna systems and future enhancements. However, the direction of travel is positive. CBRS is no longer just a policy experiment or a niche wireless band. It is becoming an important part of the US connectivity landscape.

For markets outside the United States, CBRS is worth watching because it offers a real-world example of dynamic spectrum sharing at scale. Not every country will copy the CBRS model directly, and spectrum availability, incumbent use and regulatory priorities will differ. Even so, the principles are relevant. As demand for mid-band spectrum grows, governments and regulators will need more flexible ways to balance public, private, commercial and national security needs. CBRS shows one way this can be done.

The video of the webinar is embedded below:

Related Posts:

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Telecom Security Realities from 2025 and Lessons for 2026

Telecom security rarely stands still. Each year brings new technologies, new attack paths, and new operational realities. Yet 2025 was not defined by dramatic new exploits or spectacular network failures. Instead, it became a year that highlighted how persistent, patient and methodical modern telecom attackers have become.

The recent SecurityGen Year-End Telecom Security Webinar offered a detailed look back at what the industry experienced during 2025. The session pulled together research findings, real world incidents and practical lessons from across multiple domains, including legacy signalling, eSIM ecosystems, VoLTE vulnerabilities and the emerging world of satellite-based mobile connectivity.

For anyone working in mobile networks, the message was clear. The threats are evolving, but many of the core problems remain stubbornly familiar.

A Year of Stealth Rather Than Spectacle

One of the most important themes from the webinar was that 2025 did not bring a wave of highly visible disruptive telecom attacks. Instead, it was characterised by quiet, low profile intrusions that often went undetected for long periods.

Operators around the world reported that attackers increasingly favoured living-off-the-land techniques. Rather than deploying noisy malware, intruders looked for ways to gain legitimate access to core systems and remain hidden. Lawful interception platforms, subscriber databases such as HLR and HSS, and internal management platforms were all targeted.

The primary objective in many cases was intelligence collection. Attackers were interested in call data, subscriber information and network topology rather than immediate disruption. This shift in motivation makes detection far more difficult, as there are often few obvious signs of compromise.

At the same time, automation has become a defining feature on both sides of the security battle. Operators are investing heavily in AI and machine learning to identify abnormal behaviour. Attackers are doing exactly the same, using automation to scale phishing campaigns and to accelerate exploit development.

Despite all this technology, basic security discipline continues to be a major challenge. A significant proportion of incidents still originate from human error, poor operational practices or simple failure to apply patches. The industry continues to invest billions in cybersecurity, but much of that effort is consumed by reporting and compliance activities rather than direct threat mitigation.

eSIM Security Comes into Sharp Focus

The transition from physical SIM cards to eSIM and remote provisioning is one of the most significant structural changes in the mobile industry. It offers clear benefits in terms of flexibility and user experience. However, the webinar highlighted that it also introduces entirely new security concerns.

Traditional SIM security models relied heavily on physical control. Fraudsters needed access to large numbers of real SIM cards to operate at scale. With eSIM, many of those physical constraints disappear. Remote provisioning expands the number of parties involved in the connectivity chain, including resellers and intermediaries who may not always operate under strict regulatory oversight.

During 2025 several major SIM farm operations were dismantled by law enforcement. These infrastructures contained tens of thousands of active SIM cards and were used for large scale fraud, smishing campaigns and automated account creation. While such operations existed long before eSIM, the technology has the potential to make them even easier to deploy and manage.

Research discussed in the session pointed to additional concerns. Analysis of travel eSIM services revealed issues such as cross-border routing of management traffic, excessive levels of control granted to resellers, and lifecycle management weaknesses that could potentially be abused by attackers. In some cases, resellers were found to have capabilities similar to full mobile operators, but without equivalent governance or transparency.

The conclusion was not that eSIM is inherently insecure. The technology itself uses strong encryption and robust mechanisms. The problem lies in the wider ecosystem of trust boundaries, partners and processes that surround it. Securing eSIM therefore requires cooperation between operators, vendors, regulators and service providers.

SS7 Remains a Persistent Weak Point

Few topics in telecom security generate as much ongoing concern as SS7. Despite being a technology from a previous era, it remains deeply embedded in global mobile infrastructure. The webinar dedicated significant attention to why SS7 continues to be exploited in 2025 and why it is likely to remain a problem for many years to come.

Throughout the year, media reports and research papers continued to demonstrate practical abuses of SS7 signalling. Attackers probed networks, attempted to bypass signalling firewalls and looked for new ways to manipulate protocol behaviour. Techniques such as parameter manipulation and protocol parsing tricks were highlighted as methods that can sometimes evade existing protections.

One particularly interesting demonstration showed how SS7 messages could be used as a covert channel for data exfiltration. By embedding information inside otherwise legitimate signalling transactions, attackers can potentially move data across networks without triggering traditional security alarms.

Perhaps the most striking point raised was how little progress has been made in eliminating SS7 dependencies. Analysis of global network deployments showed that only a handful of countries operate mobile networks entirely without SS7. Everywhere else, the protocol remains a foundational element of roaming and interconnect.

As a result, even operators that have invested heavily in 4G and 5G security can still be undermined by weaknesses in this legacy layer. The uncomfortable reality is that SS7 vulnerabilities will continue to be exploited well into 2026 and beyond.

VoLTE and Modern Core Network Risks

While legacy protocols remain a problem, modern technologies are not immune. VoLTE infrastructure in particular was identified as an increasingly attractive target.

VoLTE relies on complex interactions between signalling systems, IP multimedia subsystems and subscriber databases. Weaknesses in configuration or interconnection can open the door to call interception, fraud or denial of service. Several real world incidents during 2025 demonstrated that attackers are actively exploring these paths.

The move toward fully virtualised and cloud-native mobile cores also introduces new operational challenges. Telecom networks now resemble large IT environments, complete with the same risks around misconfiguration, insecure APIs and exposed management interfaces.

The Emerging Security Challenge of 5G Satellites

One of the most forward-looking parts of the webinar focused on non-terrestrial networks and direct-to-device satellite connectivity. What was once a concept for the distant future is rapidly becoming a commercial reality.

Satellite integration promises to extend 5G coverage to remote areas, oceans and disaster zones. However, it also changes the security model in fundamental ways. Satellites can act either as simple relay systems or as active components of the mobile radio access network. In both cases, new threat vectors emerge.

Potential issues discussed included the risk of denial of service against shared satellite resources, difficulties in applying traditional radio security controls in space-based equipment, and the possibility of more precise user tracking due to the way satellite systems handle location information.

Experts from the space cybersecurity community explained how vulnerabilities in mission control software and ground segment infrastructure could be exploited. Much of this software was originally designed for isolated environments and is only now being connected to wider networks and the internet.

As telecom networks expand beyond the boundaries of the Earth, security responsibilities extend with them. Operators will need to think not only about terrestrial threats but also about risks originating from space-based components.

The Human Factor and the Skills Gap

Technology was only part of the story. Another recurring theme was the global shortage of skilled telecom cybersecurity professionals.

Studies referenced in the session suggested that millions of additional specialists are needed worldwide, yet only a fraction of that demand can currently be filled. Many security teams are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of alerts and data they must process.

This shortage has real consequences. When teams are stretched thin, patching is delayed, anomalies are missed and complex investigations become difficult to sustain. The panel emphasised that throwing more tools at the problem is not enough. Organisations must focus on training, automation and smarter operational processes.

Automation and AI-driven analysis were presented as essential enablers. Given the scale of modern mobile networks, it is simply not feasible for human analysts to monitor every signalling protocol, every core interface and every emerging technology manually.

Preparing for 2026

Looking ahead, the experts agreed on several broad trends. Attacks on legacy systems such as SS7 will continue. Fraudsters will increasingly target eSIM provisioning processes. VoLTE and 5G core components will face growing scrutiny. Satellite-based connectivity will introduce new and unfamiliar security questions.

Perhaps most importantly, the line between traditional telecom security and general cybersecurity will continue to blur. Mobile networks are now large, distributed IT platforms, and they inherit all the complexities that come with that transformation.

Operators, regulators and vendors must therefore adopt a holistic view. Investment must go beyond compliance reporting and focus on practical defences, real time monitoring and collaborative intelligence sharing.

Final Reflections

The SecurityGen webinar provided a valuable snapshot of an industry at a crossroads. Telecom networks are becoming more advanced and more capable, but also more complex and interconnected than ever before.

2025 demonstrated that attackers do not always need new vulnerabilities. Often they succeed simply by exploiting old weaknesses in smarter ways. The challenge for 2026 is to close those gaps while also preparing for the technologies that are only just beginning to emerge.

For those involved in telecom security, the full discussion is well worth watching. The complete webinar recording can be viewed below:

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Quantum Internet: Evolutionary and Revolutionary Perspectives – Key Insights from the Webinar

theNetworkingChannel hosted another interesting webinar recently exploring the topic of how Quantum Internet is emerging and has many open directions, from disruptive and long-term ideas to concrete applications that can be explored with real devices today.

The panel consists of distinguished experts, including: 

• Bernardo Huberman – Fellow and Vice President of Next – Gen Systems – CableLabs – USA
• Marcello Caleffi – Professor – University of Naples “Federico II” – Italy
• Stephan Ritter – Director of Applications of Quantum Technologies – TOPTICA Photonics AG – Germany
• Stefano Pirandola – Founder and CEO – nodeQ – Professor – University of York – UK

The webinar description stated:

As Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology approaches maturity, the scientific community is now turning its attention to more advanced applications of quantum networks at metropolitan and international scales, such as distributed/delegated quantum computing and quantum sensor networks, requiring end-to-end entanglement of qubits, quantum memories, and varying degrees of fault tolerance. To make a leapfrogging advance, the co-existence of upcoming quantum networks with classical networks is also becoming more focal, with a significant impact at the physical level (i.e., the sharing of a telco fiber or rack space in an exchange point) and from a logical perspective (i.e., the integration with control/management planes of an Internet Service Provider or the interplay with classical jobs to be executed in a High-Performance Computing infrastructure). In this panel, we will discuss the research and development trends currently occupying the top positions of the priority list to make the Quantum Internet a real thing, with a tangible impact on industry, science, and society.

Key Takeaways:

The webinar looked at Quantum physics principles, such as superposition and entanglement, underlie the technology and have led to exciting developments, including the potential for quantum computers to solve complex problems and enable secure communication. Quantum entanglement can be used to coordinate parties without communication, enabling secure auctions and frequency hopping spread spectrum technology, which has been around since the 1950s. 

Early Applications and Challenges:

• Frequency hopping, used for secure communications since the 1950s, faces issues with machine learning-based attacks due to predictable sequences.
• QKD offers a solution by enabling Alice and Bob to coordinate using truly random, provably secure sequences.
• Despite its potential, building a quantum internet faces practical hurdles, including high implementation costs.

Quantum Internet Architecture: Revolution Over Evolution:

• The panel debated whether the Quantum Internet should evolve from classical networks or be a complete revolution. The consensus leaned toward a full redesign, requiring a new protocol stack rather than incremental updates.
• Entanglement is the core resource, unlike classical information, as it requires coordinated multi-node operations.

Technologies and Prototypes: 

• Quantum memories rely on specific lasers to manipulate qubits, and wavelength conversion techniques are being developed for compatibility.
• A prototype network is under construction, aiming to demonstrate teleportation and blind quantum computation by the decade’s end.
• The Quantum Internet Alliance (QIA) launched the QIA Technology Forum (QIATF) to foster collaboration among academia, industry, and ecosystem partners.

Quantum Teleportation and Distributed Computing:

• Quantum teleportation enables remote quantum computers to exchange qubits by sharing entangled states.
• This is fundamental for distributed quantum computing, where multiple machines collaborate remotely.
• Achieving a hybrid Quantum Internet will require interfaces (e.g., electro-optical converters) to connect diverse quantum systems like photonic, superconducting, and solid-state qubits.

Commercialisation and Future Outlook

• Quantum-secured communications for military use could emerge in 10–15 years.
• A full-fledged Quantum Internet could take 25 years, comparable in scale to the classical internet.
• Gradual progress is expected, with significant quantum computing milestones in 5–10 years.

While the slides have not been shared, the video of the webinar is embedded below: